[Buddha-l] Realism, anti-realism and Buddhism

Dan Lusthaus vasubandhu at earthlink.net
Mon May 26 04:10:20 MDT 2008


(Continuation of previous post)

Here is the Skt text of the Sthiramati, with a short glossary and some
questions.


tasmād dravyopucāro 'pi naiva yujyate | mukhyo 'pi padārtho nāsti
tatsvarūpasya sarvajñābhidhāna-viṣayātikrāntatvāt | pradhāne hi
guṇarūpeṇaiva jñānābhidhāne pravartete tatsvarūpāsaṃsparśāt | anyathā ca
guṇa-vaiyarthya-prasaṅgaḥ | na hi jñānābhidhāna-vyatirikto
'nya-padārtha-svarūpa-paricchitty-upāyo 'stītyataḥ
pradhāna-svarūpa-viṣaya-jñānābhidhānābhavān naiva mukhyaḥ padārtho
'stītyavagantavyam | evaṃ yāvacchande saṃbandhābhāvāj jñānābhidhānābhāva
evaṃ cābhidhānābhidheyābhāvān naiva mukhyāḥ padārtho 'sti api ca sarva
evāyaṃ gauṇa eva na mukhyo 'sti | gauṇo hi nāma yo yatrāvidya-mānena rūpeṇa
pravartate | sarvaśca-śabdaḥ pradhāne 'vidyamānenaiva guṇarūpeṇa pravartate
ato mukhyo nāstyeva | tatra yaduktam asatyāmani mukhye dharmeṇu copacāro na
yukta iti tadayukta ||

A few of the key terms
1. mukhya (literal-word) → padārtha (substantial referent of a word)
svarūpa (the essential nature and form that makes something what it is,
which would be conveyed to a cognition, or by a designation, i.e., what is
given by the thing in-itself in language or cognition.)
(sādhāraṇa – an attribute or property shared in common between two or more
things)
2. guṇa-rūpa (cognizable qualities of a substance [dravya])  → pradhāna
(substantial thing in-itself)
3. jñāna-abhidhāna (cognition and designation)
4. viṣayātikrānta (exceeds [atikrānta] the cognitive and linguistic sphere
[viṣaya])
5. asaṃsparśa (no cognitive contact at all)
6. abhidhāna and abhidheya (a designation and what is designated)

What would Dummett make of this? Sthiramati is clearly NOT a "linguistic
realist." Yet he does hold certain things to be "real," even paramarthically
so, though NOT the referents of language or "propositions". So does realism
boil down to nothing more than a literalist theory of language, and thus
having nothing to do with reality itself? Or, conversely, must everyone who
questions language's ability to literally refer be an antirealist? Who
elected language the arbitor of reality? Must prajnaptis be dravyas in order
to be realist?

Incidentally this Sthiramati passage is much more radical than anything one
will find in either Asanga or Vasubandhu.

Dan Lusthaus



More information about the buddha-l mailing list