[Buddha-l] MMK 25.09 (was: as Swami goes...)

[Dan Lusthaus]

Thanks again to Erik for the backstory to his translation attempt, which 
helped prompt Richard Nance to weigh in, and to Richard N. whose own effort 
finally prompted Richard H. to offer his opinion. Thank you one and all.

Richard Nance wrote:
>> >>>> ya ājavaṃjavībhāva upādāya pratītya vā |
>> >>>> so 'pratītyānupādāya nirvāṇam upadiśyate || MMK_25,09
>>
>> "The state of coming and going which is dependent or conditioned:
>> That, neither dependent nor conditioned, is taught to be nirvāṇa."

To which Richard Hayes added:

> That is very close to how I interpret the Sanskrit. The only further
> thing I would point out is that the compound ending in -bhāva is one
> formed with the pratyaya cvi. So I would render the compound something
> like "the process of making something come and go". Substitute that for
> Richard's "state of coming and going" and you have my translation.

That would yield:

"The process of making something come and go which is dependent or 
conditioned:
That, neither dependent nor conditioned, is taught to be nirvāṇa."

Yes? (Reader alert: Put on those gloves Richard H. warned you about -- may 
be stuff to wade through in what follows.)

Richard N. confirms that the "ya X so Y" structure provides "a standard 
relative-correlative construction -- i.e., that what is characterized by the 
qualifiers in the first line is indeed characterized by the qualifiers in 
the second (no need for the "therefore")."

The main difference between the two Richards seems to focus on "what is 
characterized by the qualifiers in the first line." Is it a process that 
makes things come and go? Or the state (condition) itself? All agree, it 
seems, that bhāva is "what is characterized by the qualifiers" -- but how to 
understand bhāva here? A bhāva without upādāya or pratītya is taught to be 
nirvana? Nirvana bereft of qualities (gunas), so a nirguna nirvana? Could 
one and the same bhāva intelligently be the locus for upādāya or pratītya 
AND be a locus for their absence? Would Nagarjuna condone such 
substantialism? Richard N. asked why I found the passage conceptually 
difficult. Here we have the beginning of the problem.

That we might, in our laziness or misguided dravya-guna thinking, typically 
let such statements go as if they were intelligible is precisely the sort of 
thing Nagarjuna repeatedly brings to our attention as a serious problem that 
camoflagues the svabhavic thinking undergirding our usual thinking. So how 
could he endorse this statement here. Or does he?

I take it that the two Richards are content to accept "dependent" and 
"conditioned" as adequate equivalents for upādāya or pratītya, respectively. 
Richard N. used "state" as a place-marker for bhāva without commitment to 
the semantic and conceptual baggage that might entail, and, as noted, 
Richard H. draws on an interpretation of the implications of the compound 
ājavaṃ-javī-bhāva to treat bhāva not only as a process, but a causative 
agent as well.

Richard N. also asks why I find the Tibetan possibly smoothing over the 
problems. Perhaps it doesn't. Jay Garfield's translation of the Tib. reads:

That which comes and goes
Is Dependent and changing
That, when it is not dependent and changing
Is taught to be nirvana.

The bhāva has disappeared behind indicative pronouns. Garfield's version 
does indicate that the opposing predicates -- "dependent and changing" vs. 
"when *it is* not dependent and changing" -- are predicated of the same 
"it."

Rather than further unpack, let me quickly provide the translations I happen 
to have on hand at the moment:

That state which is the rushing in and out [of existence] when dependent or 
conditioned--
This [state], when not dependent or not conditioned, is seen to be nirvana.
(Frederick Streng)

The status of the birth-death cycle is due to existential grasping (of the 
skandhas) and relational condition (of the being). That which is 
non-grasping and non-relational is taught to be nirvana.
(Kenneth Inada) [before you dismiss this as off-base, see below]

Whatever is of the nature of coming and going that occurs contingently or 
dependently. Freedom is, therefore, indicated as being non-contingent and 
independent.
(David Kalupahana)

That state of moving restlessly to and fro [samsara] is grasping and 
dependent.
But nirvana is taught as without grasping and without dependence.
(Nancy McCagney)

That which, taken as causal or dependent, is the process of being born and 
passing on, is, taken non-causally and beyond all dependence, declared to be 
nirvana.
(Mervyn Sprung)

So now we know where contributers peeked (or great minds think alike).

Without reviewing the strength and errors of each one by one -- and leaving 
aside for now the soundness of the proposed equivalents for the key terms 
used by each -- we note in passing that McCagney has entirely lost both the 
bhāva and the "ya-X so-Y" structure, giving only a simplistic contrast. 
Kalupahana appears to lose it, but replaces it with a "therefore". Sprung 
alone sees "process" as does Richard H. The seemingly strange one is 
Inada's. That's because he is translation the Chinese version, not directly 
from the Sanskrit.

The Kumarajiva translation, which became the standard in E. Asia, reads as 
follows, including the surrounding commentary Kumarajiva included, 
attributed to "Blue Eyes" (i.e., Frank Sinatra, though more often 
Sanskritized as Pingala), VERY literally translated.
---
Q: If Nirvana is neither existent nor non-existent, what is Nirvana?

A: [One] cycles through birth and death,
because of holding causes and conditions;
not holding causes and conditions
is called nirvana.

Because of not truly understanding [i.e., not having yathābhūta-parijñāna] 
one's cognitive-reversals (viparyāsa, "cognitive perversions"), this causes 
the holding of the five skandhas (pañca-skandha-upādāna) which come and go 
through life and death.

Because of truly understanding one's cognitive-reversals, then one does not 
again cause the holding of the five skandhas which come and go through life 
and death. Lacking the nature [to appropriate] the five skandhas, [one] 
doesn't again [engender] a causal series; this is called nirvana.
---

Like Erik, Kumarajiva took the upādāya = 受. Putting aside its more 
prominent uses in other Buddhist contexts, Monier-Williams gives this for 
upādāya: "having received or acquired; receiving, acquiring." That is 
literally what Kumarajiva's 受 shou means (I rendered it as "holding" above, 
because he is clearly referring to the pañca-skanda-upādāna , the five 
appropriational aggregates).

One can also see where Inada's reading came from. Notice also the "coming 
and going" are given clear Buddhological meaning (which, e.g., Streng 
inserted in square brackets in his rendering -- somewhat).

Is this just an accidental case of Erik and Kumarajiva taking the same 
detour off the turnpike? Kumarajiva's translation was done around 403 CE or 
so. Sometime between 1027-1030 CE, i.e., 600 years later, another 
translation of MMK into Chinese was done by Weijing and Dharmarakṣa, which 
includes Sthiramati's commentary. It reads:
---
Next, a verse says:

An existent entity having life and death
is an existent marked by going and coming;
Because of not grasping the cause of that,
That is called nirvana.

Explanation: Because of their grasping, hence one figuratively 
differentiates beings as existent living-things. All this is samvrti, not 
paramartha-satya.
---

This version uses 有體 (you ti) for bhāva. Ti is one of the equivalents for 
svabhāva (abbreviated form of ziti 自體, self-essence, in-itself, etc.). 
This is a very strong way of saying "existent entity."

Like Kumarajiva, this version also agrees with Erik in reading upādāya as 
equivalent to upādāna. It uses 取 (qu) for upādāya. Qu is typically used for 
grāha and upādāna terms, so that, e.g., grāhya-grāhaka (grasped and grasper) 
is suo-qu neng-qu 所取 能取.

Finally, Candrakirti treats the entire verse as encapsulating the misguided 
drsti of some wrong-headed Buddhists, hence he encourages us to read it as a 
non sequitur. In other words, the juxtaposition of incommensurate properties 
is not accidental or something to be smoothed away, but something 
intentionally designed to highlight the incoherency of standard Buddhist 
doctrine. And it is certainly no accident that it all revolves around bhāva 
(which tends to hide and disappear even in some modern translations!).

Ok, it's safe to remove your gloves.

Dan